Abstract This article describes a study employing a risk-assessment methodology for evaluating uncertain future climatic conditions. To understand the implications of uncertainty on risk and to provide a near-term rationale for policy interventions, the study estimated the impacts from responses to climate change on U.S. state-and national-level economic activity. The study used results of the climate-model CMIP3 dataset developed for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report to 1) estimate a proxy for representing climate uncertainty over the next 40 years, 2) map the simulated weather from the climate models hydrologically to the county level to determine the physical consequences on economic activity at the state level, and 3) perform a detailed, economy-wide, 70-industry analysis of economic impacts among the interdependent lower-48 states for the years 2010 through 2050. The analysis determined the interacting industrylevel effects, employment impacts at the state level, interstate population migration, consequences to personal income, and ramifications for the U.S. trade balance. When compared to a baseline economic forecast, the calculations produced an average risk of damage of $1 trillion to the U.S. economy from climate change over the next 40 years, with losses in employment equivalent to nearly 7 million full-time jobs. Added uncertainty would increase the estimated risk.
Overview
In this journal, Mastrandrea et al. (2010) proposed a top-down/bottom-up approach that employs integrative methods to inform decision making. Within a context of uncertainty, the bottom-up part of an analysis should reflect the societal impact of the climatic conditions represented in the top-down part. In the spirit of the Mastrandrea et al. proposal, our study, summarized below, quantified some of the risk from uncertain climate change to each of the coupled U.S. states, noting the impact on the population and 70 industries, over time, as they respond to changing climatic conditions (Backus et al. 2010) . We confined the study to the near-term risk of climate change from 2010 through the year 2050 and did not consider the larger, long-term risk of climate change, variation in greenhouse gas emissions, nor any mitigation policies. We derived a proxy probability density function (PDF) of climatic precipitation conditions for each year through 2050 based on available climate forecasts, propagated the climate uncertainty with a hydrology model, through basin water-supply and county water-demand, to determine water availability for state-level economic activity. We then determined the interdependent industrial and employment responses across the states to the changes in water availability. We focused on how the uncertainty associated with climate change affects the calculated economic risk. Section 2 presents the risk-based perspective. Section 3 explains the study design. Section 4 describes some results from the study, and Section 5 highlights the main points.
Uncertainty and risk
The analyses conducted for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) currently represent the generally recognized declaration on the future of climate change. The variation in results among the climate models used for the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) embodied the uncertainty that is most associated with climate forecasts. We applied this uncertainty in future precipitation conditions to determine the economic risk to individual U.S. states as well as the nation. In many climate studies, temperature is the common attribute used to estimate the impacts of climate change (Tol 2009; Ackerman et al. 2009 ). The uncertainty in precipitation within the CMIP3 dataset is not a true measure of uncertainty, but it is representative of the information policy makers and insurance companies would use to evaluate the risk from climate change.
The impacts from climate change are largely negative (IPCC 2007a) . From a policy perspective, the incentive to act should come from comparing the risk (cost) of inaction with the cost of action to mitigate climate change successfully. Risk is often characterized in terms of probability and consequence (Helton 1994) . There is a spectrum of conditions (or events) involved with climate change for assessing risk. At one end of the spectrum are those conditions that may occur frequently (high probability) and result in minimal damage (low consequence). An example of a high-probability, low-consequence type of event would be a hailstorm that damages the roof of your house. At the other end of the spectrum are conditions that do not occur frequently (low probability) but may be life changing or catastrophic (high consequence) if they do occur. Examples of low-probability, highconsequence types of risks would be a prolonged severe drought in an area and, at the very extreme, an asteroid collision with Earth. The less that is understood about climate change, the wider the tail on the uncertainty distribution for climate change becomes. Greater extremes in climatic conditions imply greater societal consequences, should those extremes occur. Accordingly, the greater the uncertainty is, the greater is the risk.
The consequence of adverse conditions is often framed in economic terms, such as the monetary value of lost economic activity or the number of jobs (labor-years of income) lost. However, because human behavior is so complex, there is even greater uncertainty in the prediction of future economic impacts than there is in the prediction of climate change or the emissions that cause it. We were concerned primarily with how the uncertainty in future precipitation conditions affected the deterministically-calculated economic risk around a baseline economic forecast. Economic uncertainty was not part of this analysis. The calculated impacts from the economic simulation applied in the study will almost certainly be highly inaccurate, but they can represent a coherent means to compare changes in economic conditions due to changes in the physical environment. An imprecise prediction is useful for comparing options to address a significant problem if it is assumed that such a prediction adequately defines the future, relative to the choices to be made and, more importantly, represents a mutually agreed upon referent from which stakeholders can debate alternatives on common ground. Despite uncertainty about the future, impact analyses are conducted on a daily basis as aids for policy makers on issues of critical importance to the nation, such as health care, social security, and defense. Similarly, individuals weigh the uncertain impacts of taking certain actions, such as purchasing insurance, to minimize risk for themselves and their families
In our analysis, we only considered the risk to economic activity in terms of state-level GDP and employment from the effects of climate change on water availability between the years 2010 and 2050, in the absence of legislated policy. We focused on the time period between 2010 through 2050 because the changes are small compared to what they would be from the anticipated climate change in the post-2050 years. The emphasis was on the effect of the uncertainty rather than the magnitude of the impacts. Further, the time frame is within the relevant lifespan of most people living today or their children. The study did not address variations in carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions or mitigation policy to reduce emissions. We were not performing a cost-benefit analysis.
There are many other risks from climate changes than just those associated with the economic impacts from reduced water availability. Climate-change-induced ecosystem damage, enhanced disease vectors, and extreme weather events from wind, snow, heat, cold, and flooding, could have much larger added impacts than those estimated here. The study used precipitation because it allowed the direct mapping from climate change phenomena, through hydrological consequences that directly affect economic activity, to quantified economic impacts. The intended message of the study is that the uncertainty of climate change actually reinforces the claim that climate change poses a risk to society through its impact on the economy (Stern 2007; Ackerman et al. 2009; IPCC 2007b) .
3 Analysis design and process Figure 1 presents an overview of the three major steps in the analysis process. The analysis starts with the World Climate Research Programme's (WCRP's) Coupled Model Intercomparison Project phase 3 (CMIP3) multi-model dataset (Meehl et al. 2007 ) available at: http:// www-pcmdi.llnl.gov/projects/cmip/index.php. We used the results of the 53 climate simulations of the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) A1B scenario available within the CMIP3 dataset that contain the prerequisite precipitation data (Leroy et al. 2008) . We used the detailed precipitation and temperature information to estimate a proxy for the time-dependent uncertainty among the states for precipitation from 2010 to 2050, as depicted in the left-hand box. A temperature trajectory is deterministically associated with precipitation's spatial and temporal trajectory because 53 simulations are inadequate to quantify the joint, path-dependent, distributions on temperature and precipitation. Our focus was strictly on the economic consequences of precipitation uncertainty. Our use of the deterministic temperature associated with precipitation, while also neglecting other weather uncertainty contributions to risk, such as wind, was consistent with that limited purpose. We sampled across the entire PDF and used the Sandia hydrological model (Tidwell et al. 2009 (Tidwell et al. , 2012 , represented in the middle box, to map the temperature and precipitation data to the county and state levels in the continental United States for determining the availability of water for selected industries within each state. During the third step, noted in the right-hand box, the Regional Economic Models Incorporated (REMI) macroeconomic model (REMI 2009) was employed to determine the cost of adjusting water usage to match water availability and calculate the inter-industry macroeconomic impacts across the entire economy resulting from revisions in the comparative economic advantage of each state.
We did not attempt to define the uncertainty in the climate forecasts (Webster et al. 2003; Sokolov et al. 2009) , but rather to demonstrate how the uncertainty in climate change conditions affected the calculated risks. We were not concerned with how emissions translated into precipitation or temperature changes, or in how mitigation might affect future climatic conditions. The CMIP3 simulations that are dependent on these considerations, were taken as a given. The models contained in the CMIP3 dataset are not independent and the simulations are all best estimates of future climate changes. The 53 climate simulations in the CMIP3 dataset do not represent a statistically meaningful sampling and they likely under-represent extreme tail conditions. Therefore, to maximize the inclusion of both aleatory and epistemic uncertainty, we included the results from all the simulations without weighting them by skill-levels. Our purpose was to make progress toward understanding how to quantify (uncertain) risks from climate change more than to determine the best estimate for each component of the risk chain.
We determined the future change in precipitation variation compared to historical variation, as well as the changes in volatility, to calculate only those impacts that would be in addition to those impacts caused by assuming historical weather patterns for the future. The economic model implicitly included the actual weather over the historical period and the mean of historical weather in its referent forecast.
In a manner similar to the Strzepek et al. (2010) study published after our study was completed, we mapped the precipitation to the watersheds and estimated (for our purposes, at the state level) gamma distributions to characterize the uncertainty. The continuous gamma distribution makes the results probabilistic and thereby amenable to the risk calculation. For the states of New Mexico (a dry state) and New York (a wet state), Fig. 2 depicts the fit of the cumulative gamma distribution of the 2001 through 2050 monthly-precipitation produced by the MIROC3.2 and CCSM3.0 models used in the A1B scenario simulations contained within the CMIP3 dataset. The dotted lines indicate the boundary of the 95 % and 5 % confidence interval on the estimates. The fit of the data to the cumulative gamma distribution visually confirms a good correspondence. The cumulative distribution indicates the exceedance probability (y-axis) that precipitation (x-axis) will be below the level noted by the fitted curve of the graphs.
The cumulative distribution, when presented this way, represents exceedance probabilities. In our analysis we used the concept of exceedance probabilities to describe the various levels of uncertainty. To generate the results, future conditions were simulated by using the computer models and the process noted in Fig. 1 across the full range of exceedance probabilities. As apparent from Fig. 2 , the range of exceedance probabilities extends from 100 % (the maximum realizable precipitation) to 0 % (the minimum realizable precipitation). An exceedance probability measures the likelihood (or chance) a particular consequence of climate change will exceed (be greater than) the value reported for that probability. For example, a 25 % exceedance probability means there is an estimated 25 % chance an impact will exceed the indicated value (for example, in dollars of lost GDP) associated with that percentage of impact. The body of the full report for this study (Backus et al. 2010 ) provides a detailed discussion of the analysis process and a thorough explanation of the results. Figure 3 shows the comparable, fitted, cumulative gamma distribution covering all the 53 simulations contained within the A1B Scenario of the CMIP3 dataset, but for average annual national precipitation between 2010 and 2050. The comparison of the data to the curve fit looks more ragged because there are only 53 data points. The data is nonetheless consistent with an assumption of a gamma distribution and the model results remain within the estimated confidence interval except for very low exceedance probabilities. Because, for drought conditions through 2050, the probability declines faster than the calculated consequence increases, these very low exceedance probabilities do not significantly affect the We used the national curve to sample for reduced nation-wide precipitation. It must be noted that the precipitation pattern over each state with climate change is correlated with its neighboring states, but each state's pattern has unique features. For example, most of the climate models indicate that climate change will cause increased precipitation in the Pacific Northwest, while producing strongly deceasing precipitation in the Southwest (Bates et al. 2008) . Additionally, the volatility in weather among the states varies, with states like Tennessee having relatively stable rain patterns over time and states like New Mexico having greater variability. The Online Resource contains Figures that illustrate the volatility by state as it impacts water availability. We sample the confidence interval and best estimate points for the distribution of Fig. 3 at nine exceedance probabilities along the distribution shown in Table 1 , in addition to estimates for the two boundary (100 % and 0 % exceedance probability) conditions. The points were selected to emphasize the higher risk tail and ensure the numerical integration over the probability space (to calculate total risk) has acceptable errors. At the national level, Table 1 shows the corresponding level of average precipitation over the 2010 to 2050 simulation. The percentage values shown in Table 1 correspond to the solid line "best estimate" shown in Fig. 3 . For reference, the 50 % exceedance probability is normalized to unity. This means, for example, the 99 % exceedance probability simulation will represent average national precipitation levels that are nearly 30 % higher than those associated with the 50 % (median) value exceedance probability. On the other hand, the nation on average would experience a 20 % reduction in precipitation for the 1 % exceedance probability simulation compared to the 50 % exceedance probability level. Note that even in the 1 % exceedance probability situation some states may experience future precipitation in excess of their historical precipitation level, whereas at the 99 % exceedance probability some states may still have future precipitation levels fall below historical values. In all instances, however, the sampling at lower exceedance probability produces lower precipitation within a state than what would occur at the higher exceedance probability.
Both Strzepek et al. (2010) and Sheffield and Wood (2008) showed reduced U.S. precipitation levels over time. The Sheffield & Wood study, like the IPCC AR4 (Christensen et al. 2007 ), tended to emphasize the change in U.S. precipitation according to an Eastern, Central, and Western designation. The Strzepek study and our work indicated that the general trend of a drying climate moves from the southern US to the northern areas over time. Additionally, with diminishing exceedance probability (explained below), the trend is toward reduced precipitation extending further north.
As noted above, there are insufficient simulations within the CMIP3 data set to derive a statistically meaningful relationship for change in weather pattern as a function of exceedance probability. We use the MIROC3.2 weather pattern for all the simulations to maintain the self consistency of the weather patterns over time across the climatically contiguous states.
As we sample the national-level distribution for total precipitation over the entire 40 years, we then determine the year-by-year watershed precipitation associated with that level of national precipitation along with the spatial and temporal trajectories determined by the climate model. That is, the year-to-year precipitation is not an independent variable. The sample is the climate-model generated precipitation and temperature profile corresponding to the sampled national level of precipitation. The probability envelope (confidence intervals) of state or national precipitation over time does not represent a trajectory, but only a statement of the probability that an unconditional sampling of the precipitation in a given year would have that value. If the precipitation were at the mean value one year, it would almost certainly not have the mean value the next year. As such, we used a single trajectory over the entire time period for each sampling.
The trajectory approach captures not only the change in variability over time but also the change in volatility. The volatility, for example, contains the duration and intensity of droughts. We associated the precipitation with its modeled temperature and explicitly incorporated the frequency and intensity of future climatic conditions. The trajectory, with its sequence of positive and negative precipitation deviations, is what cause the physical change in water availability that lead to the economic responses and calculated impacts. A smooth mean trend, for example, toward drier average conditions is not what an area actually experiences. The Online Resource shows examples of the state-level volatility as it relates to water availability over time.
The sample precipitation trajectories were then fed into the Sandia hydrological model (Tidwell et al. 2004 (Tidwell et al. , 2009 (Tidwell et al. , 2012 . For the purposes of this effort, the Sandia hydrological model assumes that a constant fraction of precipitated water becomes surface water. This surface water is part of the water supply. The other part of supply is the withdrawal of ground water based on current planning and policy trends (Solley et al. 1993 (Solley et al. , 1998 Hutson et al. 2005; Maupin and Barber 2005) . The water demand is built up by county, via industrial, agricultural and population needs, as based on the economic forecast.
The future municipal demand considers domestic, public supply, commercial use and is based on volumetric water use per capita. For the analysis, future county population is the actual year 2000 population increasing at projected U.S. census growth rates (U.S. Census Bureau 2004), but scaled to maintain the total, future, state-level population from the baseline projection of the REMI model. The future water use per capita is based on a linear regression of historical USGS-estimated usage over time for each county, constrained to not produce an increase or decrease of more than 20 % over the duration of the simulation (Tidwell et al. 2009 ).
Future industrial water demand is based on sector-specific gross-state product and water intensity. The future county-level sector-specific GSP is the historical county level GSP grown at the state-level rates. The future county-level water intensity is again a linear regression analogous to that used for the municipal demands. Water consumption in mining is not well correlated with the GSP because of the wide swings in commodity prices. The future water demand for mining is simply a trended function of time. This assumption has minimal impact on results because the analysis only considers changes in water availability and economic impact compared to the baseline case.
Water demand in the agricultural sector considers losses from direct use at farms and from conveying water to farms or fields, as well as from the direct consumptive use of the crop itself. Estimated losses are taken directly from published USGS data (Solley et al. 1998) . We calculate the consumptive losses from crops as the product of historical average irrigation rates for specific crop types and the associated irrigated acreage (USDA 2008). The demand for irrigation water is assumed to change with the forecasted change in crop production, again where county-level values are the historical value, scaled to the projected state level changes.
Electric generation water usage is based on fuel usage by the power generators. REMI calculates future fossil fuel use by the power generation sector endogenously; nuclear and hydro usage is implicitly exogenous to the REMI model, but is endogenous to the Sandia hydrological model. Table 2 summarizes the process for estimating water demand. The Sandia Hydrology model calculates both usage and consumption. A detailed discussion of the hydrological model is presented in Tidwell et al. (2009 Tidwell et al. ( , 2012 . The hydrology model uses the McCarl et al. (2008) model to simulate the impacts of climate change on agricultural production, distinguishing irrigation and natural precipitation, along with precipitation intensity and frequency in combination with temperature. The transfer of water between agricultural rights and high-value urban/industrial uses assumes historical precedence among the states in such matters.
The rights to use water (water availability) within the water system are often more dictated by the rights or compacts associated with the water than by the actual physical volume of water. Although most states do not have a water market, we did calculate what the cost of the transfer might be by assuming a high nation-wide water cost of $1500 per acrefoot. Even with these rates, the total reallocation cost was negligible compared to the economic cost incurred as industry accommodates reduced water-supply. We also considered this cost to be comparable to the cost of increasing water storage.
Water supply is built up at the watershed level, recognizing that the precipitation probabilities are not independent across the states, but rather are of larger regional water patterns modified by climate change. Based on the USGS streamflow data for 23,000 gages (Stewart et al. 2006) , we estimate the average streamflow, from which we separate groundwater withdrawals, storage, and actual consumption, from headwater to terminus, to estimate average surface water supply by watershed.
Proceeding from consumption by county, we area-weight the consumption of the coinciding counties upon the 6-digit hydrological unit code (HUC) areas. The proportional transfer of surface water flow from one watershed to neighboring others is based on historical flow relationships, less the consumption within the watershed. We did not calculate the potentially increased evapotranspiration, due to the increased temperature of climate change, which could further reduce the available surface-water supply and increase the reported risk. Because the changes in the relationships of precipitation, surface water, and evapotranspiration within the U.S. were inconclusive (Sheffield and Wood 2008; Seager et al. 2008) , the study did not attempt to adjust the historical fraction of runoff. The future amount of precipitation falling within the watershed is then the historical average value scaled by the future state level precipitation from the climate models compared to historical values. The changes in surface water supply due to precipitation within the water shed basin are proportional to the change in precipitation. The supply is allocated to each county based on demand (using an assumption of homogeneity of supply within the watershed). By having the supply and demand by county, a summation over the counties within each state produces the supply and demand by state. A more detail discussion of the supply calculations are provided in Tidwell et al. (2009 Tidwell et al. ( , 2012 . The mapping of the climate model grid to state and county levels is discussed in the Online Resource).
Water availability is essentially the ratio of useable supply to demand, and, as such, it must take into account how water is managed within each state. Reduced precipitation, even though absolute levels of water supply remain high, can imply that the portion of the supply that can effective serve the demand is inadequate. States that currently have an abundant water supply compared to demand (e.g. the Midwest and East Coast) typically have less storage and collection processes than states that are already using most of the available water (e.g. the Southwest). This lack of storage means that in states with abundant water supply, reduced precipitation will require economic response well before physical water supply falls to the level of water demand.
This analysis considered consumption rather than usage as the limiting condition for water availability. For example, power plants can construct cooling ponds to cope with reduced river flow, but the ability to obtain make-up water for the ponds remains a limiting condition. As detailed in the Online Resource, the analysis differentiated the water availability thresholds for each state. The water availability translates into physical consequences for the intertwined economic activities among the states and industries. Reduced water availability for cooling can mean temporary constraints on production. Reduced water availability for consumption can mean reduced output.
The primary economic impacts occur as companies change equipment and processes to reduce water needs. For cooling purposes, in our simulation, these endogenous (autonomous) changes can reflect cooling ponds or even dry-cooling towers. For potable or "cleansing" water needs, the cost can go beyond the more efficient recycle of water to the use of distillation. In areas near an ocean coast, saline water can be used for cooling or desalination. Ground sources of non-potable water can also serve some needs, but the cost is generally prohibitive compared to other alternatives. These investments to obtain additional water resource or to reduce water usage/consumption can cause other operational inefficiencies and lead to increased costs. If the industry is already using water near the maximum efficiency, such as is often the case with mining operations, the only response is to repeatedly reduce production during times of a water deficit. The loss of production (such as for agriculture) or increased costs (such as for industrial processes) affects the downstream users of products from those sectors through the transfer of increased costs. The increased costs can in turn affect other industries using those products or services, as well as final users (consumers). The increased costs translate to increased prices that will generally cause a reduction in demand, increase imports from other areas (domestic and international with concomitant increased transportation costs), reduced production, and reduced employment.
We used the REMI macroeconomic model to determine how the reduction in production or increased cost of adjusting to reduced water availability affected the state economies each year. The REMI model, originally developed in 1977 by Regional Economic Models Incorporated, is a computable general equilibrium (CGE) forecasting model that incorporates Input-Output, time-varying, demand and supply-side Econometrics (Treyz and Treyz 2004) , and Economic Geography (Fan et al. 2000) . We selected the REMI model because governmental departments within all 50 states have used the REMI model and have some familiarity with it. Further, REMI is routinely used in regional analyses that ultimately include involvement of all 50 states (for example, see Western Climate Initiative 2010; Loose et al. 2010 ). The REMI model is a dynamic model with annual resolution through the year 2050. It can be configured to include any interacting combination of counties, states, and the nation, with a disaggregation of up to 169 industries and 94 occupations. It simulates population aging and migration dynamics (REMI 2007) . We used a 50-state, plus District of Columbia, version of the model detailing 70 interacting industries concentrating on the climate impacts among the commercially-interconnected, lower-48 states. The 70 industries are aggregates that, in total, encompass all economic activity within the U.S. states.
Depending on changing competition and local costs, simulated industries contract and expand, causing changes in wages, employment, and population movement. Local, end-use demand responds over-time to population, price, and income changes, with consequent impacts on interstate imports and exports. International exports and imports depend on the relative costs of state commodities compared to their international versions. The interactions among the states (and the rest of the world) occur as changing competitive pressures cause labor and industry reactions. Time series and panel data are used to parameterize the equations. The REMI model is calibrated to historical conditions and behavioral propensities.
A few examples may help further illustrate how reduced water availability leads to economic impacts. The chemical industry uses water for cooling and consumes it in its production process. If the chemical industry experiences a 10 % deficit, it would act to reduce its water consumption by 10 %. It would retrofit its cooling systems to reduce water consumption. Most probably this retrofit would be in the form of converting its wet cooling towers to dry cooling with an investment cost that we estimate to be $14.43 (2000$) per cubic meter (m 3 ) of waters conserved. The increased operating costs for using dry cooling are estimated to be $3.66/m 3 (2000$). The industry can reduce direct consumption through the increased treating and recycling of the water employed, for example, as a cleaning agent or as a solvent, or in the reduction of or recovery of evaporative consumption. In both instances, the cost is again essentially $3.66/m 3 of water conserved. These costs and investments are exogenously supplied to the REMI model.
How these investment costs translate to the total fixed cost component of the end product price or how the water conservation increases the variable cost component of the end product price depends on the geographic location of the industry and specific products produced, that is, on state-level cost-structure relationships. Note that if the industry is in a state adjacent to an ocean it may be less expensive to use desalinated water (estimated at $1.62/m 3 ) than change production processes to reduce consumption. There are limitations in the ability to reduce water consumption and once those limits are reached, additional water deficits lead to reduced production. The derivation of these costs and the calculations used to convert the calculated water deficit into the experienced cost or production changes are provided in Appendix B of Backus et al. (2010) . The retrofit investments for reduced water use in cooling leads to new economic activity in construction and concomitant new demand for products and services supporting that construction.
The resulting increased cost to the chemical industry reducing its water dependency will affect chemical prices for the industries that purchase the chemical products, such as food processing, petrochemical, medical, and electronic industries. The change in cost can reduce demand for the chemical, with a consequent loss of employment. Part of the reduced demand may be because the downstream industry can purchase the chemical less expensively from states less affected by water deficits, or from international sources.
The impact of water deficits on electric power production is limited to impacts on cooling water supply, but the impact on electricity prices and flow of costs to other industries is conceptually identical to that for the chemical industry. In the case of hydropower, the water usage is for actual generation and a change in water availability generally represents an actual reduction of generation. The generation must be replaced by existing or new facilities, within the state or within neighboring states. To minimize the cost of replacing flexible and reliable hydropower, these facilities will likely be fossil fueled. New facilities replacing the hydro-generation represent large construction projects that can have a noticeable, positive impact on a state's economy. Mining is an industry that already uses water with near maximum efficiency. Water deficits will largely result in reduced output.
The reduction of water availability to the agricultural sector leads to reduced crop production and yields. The primary economic impact is on the farm support industries (for example, equipment and chemicals). The reduction in local agricultural produce means local food processors must either import produce and crops from other areas, with increased transportation costs, or forego their own production. These downstream economic losses can be significantly larger in magnitude than the direct economic loss to the farming sector. Figure 4 depicts the flow of interactions stemming from reduced water variability and percolating through the economy.
More generally, as simulated in the REMI model, changes in industry conditions occur as an industry reduces or increases investments as a function of profitability. Only depreciation can reduce the actual amount of physical capital, but production is affected by demand. In the face of reduced water availability, companies and households can modify processes or equipment to improve water-use efficiency. As implied above, some of these changes have no or minimal cost. In our analysis, companies make the minimal investment to adhere to those limits from a collection of generic technologies and options whose cost and efficacy were determined in previous studies (Backus et al. 2010, Appendix B) .
Other changes require significant investments that affect long-term costs, and therefore affect future demand and profitability. Reduced demand leads to reduced employment, with some companies and populations then shifting to different states. Costs across all industries can change as support industries incur costs when they respond to water deficits. The other industries, in turn, make economic adaptations to minimize the impact. Increases in energy costs, such as electricity, would result in autonomous improvement in energy efficiency. However the motivation for these improvements is the minimization of cost impacts and not reduced GHG emissions.
REMI uses historical data for state-level parameterizations to estimate migration based on the relative cost of living, wages, and job availability in other states versus the current state. These relationships are weighted by a constant term reflecting relative attractiveness and distance to the other areas. Many studies indicate that economic conditions principally motivate migration behaviors. (Treyz et al. , 1993 Greenwood et al. 1991; Vag et al. 2009) The referent economic forecast through 2050 assumed no change in climate over the average 1980 through 2010 levels. The referent forecast is based on the official Department of Commerce, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) forecast of the population and labor force, with its economic activity forecast extended to 2050 consistent with the labor participation forecasts (REMI 2007) . REMI then endogenously simulates the change in state-level Fig. 4 Examples of how water availability affects the economy employment, population and business activity as hydrological conditions change. All reported impacts are the differences between the referent forecast and the modifiedprecipitation simulations.
Our study analysis specifically addresses how consumers and industries respond (adapt) in the absence of policy initiatives to the changing economic and physical conditions created by climate change. These responses are attempts by individual entities to lessen the economic impacts that would otherwise occur, and thus, any integrated economic assessment needs to incorporate the adaptive actions that people take to compensate for negative events. The methodology underlying the analysis, which is implemented through the REMI model, is based on historical response patterns of industries and consumers-how real people in business and on a personal level have reacted in the past to changing economic conditions and events. We can use the historical relationships because all the simulated future responses are comparable to historically-similar responses to the effects of reduced water availability. There are no assumptions of a change in behaviors due to a new type of response from the direct concern for climate change. The REMI model has also been used for estimating climate mitigation costs and economic impacts at the state level (Heck et al. 2010 ).
Analysis results
Some notable results from the analysis follow, including impacts on the U.S. GDP, employment, and industry. Economic studies often apply discount rates in their calculations of future costs either to (1) better accommodate adverse situations in the future based on the assumption that people will have greater access to resources in the future or (2) recognize that adversity in the present has a greater impact on human decision making than those threats that are still in a distant future. Because of the current controversy surrounding the use of different discount rates to assess the economic impacts of climate change, this study estimated the impacts using three discount rates: 0 % per year, 1.5 % per year, and 3.0 % per year. The 1.5 % rate roughly corresponds to the discount rate used in the Stern Review (Stern 2007) . Other authors make a strong case for a 0 % rate (Dasgupta et al. 1999; Posner 2004) , whereas the 3 % rate more closely conforms to historical orthodoxy (or conventional practice) in economic analyses (EPA 2000; OMB 2008) . The discount rate used to value, or to finance, future adaptation and mitigation cost is a policy decision. While the national summary tables do note the cost using three discount rates, we simply report the accounting cost (the cost in the absence of a discount rate) for state level impacts. This approach seemed to allow a more direct comparison of the relative ranking of risk across the states. In such a context, we use the term "at-cost" to note that the costs have not been discounted. The larger the discount rate is, the smaller is the calculated present-value of future impacts. All costs are presented in 2008 U.S. dollars. Figure 5 shows the estimated reduction in the U.S. GDP over the period 2010 to 2050 at various levels of uncertainty on an at-cost basis (no discounting). The values on the solid red line represent the total cost over the 40-year period. These values are mean climate-change impacts and are noted as the "best estimate." The extreme risk is the possibility of losing most of the economy, as associated with the far-right extreme of Fig. 5 . For reference, the baseline U.S. GDP grows from approximately $14T to $52T over the 40 years.
The dashed lines in Fig. 5 are important because they characterize the knowledge of the uncertainty of the best-estimate values to within 90 % confidence, reflecting a lower and an upper limit on the uncertainty, from 5 % (lower dashed line) to 95 % (upper dashed line). Effectively, the dashed lines represent the uncertainty for the best-estimate exceedance-probability values. The dashed lines reflect the uncertainty-of-the-uncertainty of the estimated economic impacts, as caused by the propagation of the uncertainty in the estimated PDF derived from the CMIP3 dataset through the hydrology and economic model. In other words, in the context of proxy uncertainty distribution, for any given point on the bestestimate line, it is highly likely that the impact will lie somewhere between the corresponding values on the enveloping dashed lines. In this instance, as the exceedance probability goes below 25 %, the cost begins to increase sharply.
This study generated U.S. GDP impacts in 2050 that are comparable to the impacts determined in the Stern Review (Stern 2007) and in its associated studies (Ackerman et al. 2009 ). The Stern Review, however, includes noneconomic losses that are not contained in this study. Mendelsohn et al. (2000) considered global impacts that include the United States as a studied region, but these researchers derived a positive impact on the GDP within the 2050 time frame. The Mendelsohn study is a static analysis of the impacts associated with a 2°C temperature increase, while the Stern Review and this study dynamically follow the accumulating year to year impacts. Previous analyses, including the Stern Review, have relatively simple damage functions that primarily capture only the direct impacts (Nordhaus and Yang 1996) . The use of combined industry-level econometrics and input-output methods, as applied in this study, highlights the effects of economic multipliers that capture added indirect impacts as damages flow through the economy to suppliers and employees. Importantly, as occurs in other studies (WSOFM 1997; CESP 2009; Chase 1996) , the direct plus indirect economic and labor impacts are typically two to five times larger than the direct impacts.
Our costs measured risk rather than the more conventional cost associated with a mean climate condition in the future, or even from extreme scenarios. Table 3 shows selected exceedance-probability values associated with the "best estimate" (mean) line in Fig. 5 at three discount rates. Also included for each rate is the value for the summary (or total) risk. The total risk of climate change is the integral of the consequence weighted by its probability of occurrence, over the entire range of the exceedance probabilities from 100 % to 0 %, for all years, for all events considered in the study.
It should be noted that even if there was abundant water, on average, forecasts of climate change still have a trend toward reduced precipitation in the U.S. that includes both drought and flood conditions (Strzepek et al. 2010; Sheffield and Wood 2008) . Further, the CMIP3 dataset simulations indicate there would be a shift over time in the geographical patterns of precipitation, in which the reduced precipitation initially realized in the Southwest expands toward the Northeast. As stated previously, the reported risk only considers the impact of reduced precipitation and excludes other risks such as from heat, snow, or wind. The cost of flooding has not been included in the assessment. Flooding is easier to accommodate than drought, with lesser costs, and is the subject of other studies (McKinsey 2009 ).
The total estimated (average) loss to the GDP, the summary risk, due to climate change is approximately $1.2 trillion at-cost through 2050. The forecast annual loss to the GDP by 2050, at the 50 % exceedance probability, could exceed $60 billion per year and, at the 1 % exceedance probability, could exceed $130 billion per year. The summary loss is 0.2 % of the cumulative GDP, but its $1.2 trillion impact is disproportionally significant to those who locally experience the loss. For example, local mining, agriculture, and their support industries experience larger-than-average proportional losses. Further, when taken in isolation, this value can give a false comfort in disregarding post-2050 impacts. The impacts increase rapidly in the end years of the analysis. Had the analyses been continued further into the future, the reported cost would be much larger than the 2050 cost estimated here due to much larger annual losses. Figure 6 shows the impacts on employment measured in lost labor years from 2010 to 2050 at various levels of uncertainty. A labor year is the equivalent labor-service that one person produces by working full-time over one year. If two people are unemployed for six months each, that loss corresponds to one labor year. For reference, the 2010 labor-force was approximately160 million people (out of a population of 310 million) and by 2050 is projected to be on the order of 240 million people (out of a forecasted population of 430 million). Table 4 shows the employment-loss values associated with the mean ("best-estimate" solid blue line) in Fig. 6 . The total risk is nearly 7 million lost labor years due to climate change. The annual job loss by 2050 at the 50 % exceedance probability is nearly 320,000 full-time jobs. At the 1 % exceedance probability by 2050, the annual job loss rises to nearly 700,000 full-time jobs. Note that this information on annual losses is taken from data and is not shown in Fig. 6 .
When water availability limits economic production within the United States, one alternative is to import the lost commodities, especially food. We only focus on the U.S. state-level impact of climate change in the absence of climate impacts outside the U.S. If the rest of the world remains unaffected, then the analysis indicates that lost agriculture and higher manufacturing costs in the U.S. would lead to a modest increase in U.S. imports through 2050 ranging from $0.5B to $8B per year. Actual trade-balance impacts would be vastly different than these ceteris paribus estimates when climate change affects tradingpartner countries with greater vulnerabilities than the U.S. The international impacts of climate change will increase global commodity costs and affect the trade balance more than reflected in our limited study. An analysis that includes international impacts is needed to quantify the risk associated with international trade, and it is the focus of our ongoing research.
Because climate change is predicted to increase the volatility of temperature and precipitation, the estimated impacts over time also show volatility. Figure 7 illustrates the annual impacts on the national GDP as a function of varying exceedance probabilities for reduced water availability, as stated in the legend of the graph. As shown, greater losses are evident in succeeding years, and the lower exceedance probabilities are associated with greater impacts on the GDP.
In Fig. 7 , the estimated annual loss for 2015 at the 99 % exceedance probability is on the order of $10 billion, whereas at the 1 % exceedance probability, the annual loss is almost $30 billion. The same representative pattern of volatility is used in all the simulations run at the different exceedance probabilities to produce the results. Had a more challenging and increasingly volatile pattern of interannual climatic conditions been used, the economic impacts would be larger and more problematic (due to their more extreme volatility) than the summary monetary impacts of this study indicate. In this study, industry and the population respond myopically (and often only partially) to the transient conditions that the volatility entails. However, once the investment or adaptation is made to the then existing capital stock, it is assumed to last throughout the simulation. Because the spread of volatility in climate change appears to grow faster over time than the mean values, risk-informed planning to accommodate climate change will have to include much more than the mean estimate of future conditions.
The variation in employment depicted in Fig. 8 shows a similar pattern to the variation in the GDP seen in Fig. 7 , though there are differences. These differences reflect diversity in −3,815 −5,463 −6,601 −7,468 −8,166 −8,587 −9,764 −10,819 −12,961 −6,863 the amount of employment demanded per unit of output across industries. Some industries are more labor intensive than others and experience a greater loss of jobs. For comparable years, say, 2015 and 2028, the losses (dips) portrayed across the two figures are deeper for employment than for the GDP. Certain labor-intensive industries, such as agriculture, food processing, and retail trade (Young 2010; Peneva 2007) , are being affected more than others in these two particular years. The geographical concentration of specific industries varies throughout the country. In later years, such as in 2045, the patterns of employment and GDP are closer, meaning that more industries, across a larger part of the nation, are experiencing similar losses in employment. This suggests that impacts of climate change are spreading throughout the entire economy by this time.
Figures 9 and 10 present the summary-risk losses for the GDP and employment, respectively, as a geographic distribution over individual states. This information conveys the impacts of climate change with which state-level governments and business are likely to contend. If the summary-risk (the integral of the consequence, over the PDF, over the 40 years) is negative, it means there is an expected loss of GDP (or employment). If the total risk is positive, it means there is a net gain in the GDP (or employment). The colorcoded legend, consisting of ranges of percent impacts, explains how to interpret the figures. The red color indicates a clear (at-cost) loss in GDP, up to the maximum, calculated, proportional loss. The yellow color indicates a neutral condition of relatively small, tentative, losses or gains. The green indicates clear net positive effects, up to the maximum, calculated, proportional gain. Intermediate colors indicate intermediate positions of loss or gain. Note that it is the percentage of impact, not the amount of impact, which determines the color assigned to each state. Thus, the colors represent the relative nature of the impacts. In Fig. 7 Annual U.S. GDP impacts from climate change Fig. 9 , only six states experience gains in the GDP as a result of climate change. However, even this conclusion is deceptive. The total risk over the full range of exceedance probabilities may be positive, but for a significant range of exceedance probabilities, the impacts are negative. The GDP losses exhibited by all the states indicate what it would be worth to avoid climate-induced precipitation changes even within short-term planning horizons, that is, if mitigation is possible. In Texas, for example, there is a risk of losing about $137 billion over the 40-year period, representing a negative impact to the state's economy of between 0.1 % and 0.2 %. The employment losses in Fig. 10 indicate the pressures policy makers are likely to experience to minimize the impacts of climate change. Employment impacts have less of a proportional range than do GDP impacts because people can adapt through moving to where there are more job opportunities and by accepting reduced wages that allow labor to remain employed in the area, albeit often in low value-added industries.
A more detailed example may help in understanding the analysis results. Despite suffering relatively greater drought conditions on average, compared to the rest of the nation, California shows improvements by 2050 because its economic impacts are estimated to become relatively less than those of surrounding states. Populations from other affected states migrate to California and stimulate its economy. The population increase does reduce the water availability in California further, but the GDP gain exceeds the loss-improvements in high value-added industries (such as manufacturing) more than compensate for increased losses in the low value-added industries, such as agriculture. This comparative advantage occurs because some states, such as Virginia, do not have much flexibility in dealing with water deficits, for example, because they have little agricultural irrigation from which water can be diverted. By and large, those states, such as Arizona and New Mexico, which already suffer water constraints (often due to irrigation loads combined with urban growth in arid regions), have processes in place to adjust to changes in water balances. For Arizona and New Mexico, those processes actually prevent calculated losses from being worse than they would otherwise be. Through the use of water purchases, irrigation water can act as a buffer against water deficits in other parts of the economy.
In the near term and at higher exceedance probabilities, California does incur largely negative impacts. Note that the impacts for many states change sign over time. That is, many states alternately experience gains (positive sign) and losses (negative sign). Colorado initially experiences positive impacts from climate change and from migration into the state from more affected states. In the long term, however reduced precipitation diminishes the total benefits over the 40 year period. Some states, such as, Minnesota and New York incur early negative impacts that produce adaptations which significantly limit future negative impacts in later years.
The Pacific Northwest states show improvement with climate change due to expected increased precipitation and population growth through migration. It is possible, however, that the damage to this region from climate change may be understated. Because this analysis is limited to the annual resolution of precipitation levels (other than capturing the monthly variation for agricultural assessments), the impact of seasonal phenomena such as snow has not been captured. In the Pacific Northwest, the dam system is not designed to accommodate significant changes in the timing of when and how fast snow melts. The snow itself acts as a water-storage system and under conditions of warmer temperatures, the increased river flow from melting snow cannot be effectively stored behind the dams nor can the additional water be efficiently used in producing electricity. Consequently, the positive impacts shown could be an artifact of the study assumptions. On the other hand, migration to the Pacific Northwest may provide positive impacts even as the timing of water supply changes. While net impacts from the reduced precipitation risks of climate change are mostly negative, some industries, as discussed below, do benefit from the new conditions. Expected urban population growth and an expanding economy in the eastern United States will stress existing water supplies in the future even in the absence of climate change. Consequently, climate change will cause the Northeast and the Southeast to experience additional negative impacts from reduced water availability, even though reductions in longterm precipitation may be minimal. In general, a decreasing exceedance probability (e.g., from 50 % to 1 %) implies that reduced precipitation (i.e., drought) is moving north and east at a continental level, causing more-severe reductions in precipitation in areas that did not noticeably experience reduced precipitation at the larger exceedance probabilities (>50 %).
Even in the Mountain Region, states such as Colorado, which already have mean-value temporal switching of positive and negative impacts, have additional statistical switching. That statistical switching will include going from having adequate water and benefits in high-exceedance-probability simulations to experiencing overall losses from reduced water availability in the low-exceedance-probability simulations. Other than in the Pacific Northwest, water availability decreases over time with climate change. Table 5 gives the numerical values of GDP impacts from 2010 to 2050 with three discount rates. Table 6 gives the impacts on employment (net amount through 2050) and from population migration (net amount through 2050). Employment changes and population migration represent changes in material conditions, as opposed to a change in monetary status for GDP impacts, and thus are not discounted.
Migration across states is often based on comparative economic advantage. Even if a given state economy is having difficulties, it may be having less difficulty than other states. As indicated in Table 6 , the reduced economic activity does reduce employment in New York by 560,000 labor years by 2050 even though the population has risen by 7,200 people by 2050 due to in-migration from the even-more-affected surrounding states. This means that the unemployment in New York is increasing even more than the drop in economic activity would indicate. If the other states were less affected by climate change, New York would have experienced out-migration. Table 7 presents the estimated risks to selected industries from climate-change uncertainty. The results shown are presented in terms of their contribution to the U.S. GDP, rather than, for example, sales or revenue. The calculated impact on sales and revenue would be larger than the reported GDP impacts, varying between less than 1.5 times larger than the GDP impact for retail sales to more than 3.0 times larger for manufacturing. The impacts on industry sectors vary by state. At the national level they are comparable to those of the U.S. GDP impacts (tenths of a percent over the 40 years). However, for some states, a particularly water-sensitive industry may play a large role in the economy and its loss dominates the climate change impact on the state. For example, in West Virginia, the impact on mining represents a 3 % of GDP risk to the state. State-level detail for individual industry impacts are provided in the study report (Backus et al. 2010) .
Due to construction, especially of power plants to augment lost hydroelectric capacity, positive effects in terms of economic value are experienced by utilities, electric equipment, and other manufacturing that supports those industries. Investments, such as those associated with construction, are a positive contribution to GDP, even if they are to compensate for lost productive capacity due to climate change. In the long term, if the investments cause added costs that reduce competiveness, there would be a loss from reduced economic activity. Because of international financial markets, these added investments do not crowd out investments in other states or industries. At the national level, construction experiences a decline because of the overall national decline in economic growth due to climate change.
At the national-level, transportation (not shown) sees a net zero economic impact, despite an overall reduction in economic activity, because of the added need for interstate trade, especially for food. Many professional services, including medical, suffer a decline because unemployment constrains additional spending. Agriculture-dependent industries, such as the chemical industry, encounter disproportional declines. Like agriculture, climate change strongly affects the mining industry because of the mining industry's relatively rigid dependence on water. Transportation in many states improves with climate change because of the need to import more goods no longer produced locally and to export the goods no longer needed locally. Construction in the north improves as with the replacement of lost hydro capacity with new fossil or renewable generation capacity. Increased agriculture occurs in the Midwest but does not fully compensate for the loss of food items previously grown in the Southwest.
Conclusions
This study focused on the uncertainty and volatility of climate change rather than on the smooth, best-estimate transition to expected future conditions. The uncertainty associated with climate change, combined with the consequences it entails, defines the risk from climate change. Further, the volatility of conditions over time means the risk assessment needed to go beyond a static analysis and address the dynamics of the impacts and of the responses.
This study used the range of global climate model (GCM) runs of the SRES A1B scenario to examine the risks from climate change due to reduced U.S. precipitation. The study did not include the risks from other sources, such as wind, heat or enhanced disease vectors. It directly used the results available in the CMIP3 dataset and did not consider the additional uncertainty such as from emission or mitigation levels. The variation in results among the CMIP3 datasets do not represent a formal statistical quantification of uncertainty because they do not, for example, embody a design of experiment to vary parameters across models in a manner that allows a probabilistic interpretation of the results, nor do they contain the systematic variation of the physics used to simulate underrepresented phenomena, such as cloud formation and aerosol interaction, that could change the understanding of climate dynamics. The formal characterization of climate uncertainty for refining the risk assessment is one of the next steps in improving the analysis presented here.
The detailed, time-dependent approach used in the analysis shows the additional early consequences of the volatility in climate change. The impacts across the entire U.S. economy, as detailed across 70 industry-aggregates and the lower-48 states, demonstrate the interrelationships that produce consequences different from those consequences that would be indicated by the analysis of individual states or economic sectors in isolation. This adds the interacting effects of climate change across the U.S. states to the body of impact analyses. This risk assessment only considered the loss in the absence of mitigation policy or any other climate policy. The estimated, at-cost, value of the loss is on the order of a trillion (2008) dollars for the United States. From a purely indemnity perspective and within the context of only the recognized precipitation uncertainty, this value can be interpreted as a point of reference on how much U.S. society could be willing to pay for a successful mitigation of climate change, even over the near term. In this view, the risk-informed approach used in this work relates physical climate science to the societal consequences and thus directly helps inform policy debate. The integrated process of (1) recognizing uncertainty in climate-change forecasts, (2) transforming climate-change phenomena into physical impacts that affect economic and societal processes, and (3) converting those physical impacts to time-dependent changes in economic and societal conditions, provides the end-to-end assessment capability recommended by the Obama Administration (Holdren 2009) . By knowing what aspects of climate change have the most severe human consequences, this type of analysis can also help guide and prioritize the scientific research to better quantify the most critical phenomena. It is important to reemphasize that the methods of this study reveal how compelling risk derives from uncertainty, not certainty. 
